How to tell the difference between a conspiracy theory and a theory about a conspiracy

5 min readDec 1, 2020

Part 3/5: What is driving conspiratorial thinking?

Conspiracy theories tend to be characterized by an unreasonable skepticism on the one hand (e.g. “the earth is not sphere-shaped”), and by an unreasonable belief on the other (e.g. “the earth is flat”). Curiously, conspiracy theorists are extremely confident that their skepticism and beliefs are actually well justified and completely reasonable. Independent fact checking efforts and contradictory rational/scientific findings tend to be dismissed without regard for their actual evidentiary strength. Some even see themselves as righteous fighters for a “true” scientific practice against an academic mainstream, which they believe to be subject to mass-corruption or mass-delusion. How is such a grave misperception possible? What is driving it? The following sections will explore the belief in conspiracy theories from three perspectives as:

a psychological self-defense mechanism
a substitute for religious faith
a socio-cultural response to economic globalization and postmodernism

The belief in conspiracy theories as a psychological self-defense mechanism

Modern psychological research has identified numerous reasoning fallacies and cognitive biases that untrained humans tend to be susceptible to. Some of these well-studied psychological phenomena offer helpful explanations for the subconscious mechanisms that facilitate and maintain conspiratorial thinking:

“confirmation bias” (i.e. a subconscious preference for evidence that appears to be affirmative and dismiss evidence that is contrary to our beliefs),
“proportionality bias” (i.e. a tendency to assume that “big” events must have “big” causes)
“motivated reasoning” (i.e. a subconscious rationalization of emotionally desired premises),
minority influence (i.a e. disproportionate influence of a committed and consistent minority on a majority position)
The Dunning-Kruger effect (also known as “illusory superiority”) describes the tendency of non-experts to be unaware about their own incompetence, leading them to be overconfident about their ability to succeed at a task that requires expertise.

Many of these mechanisms seem to serve the function of avoiding cognitive dissonance — an experience of discomfort caused by the confrontation with a truth that questions one’s fundamental assumptions. In this context, Wong-Parodi and Feygina point out that people tend to respond defensively to stressful or threatening events and information that call into question one’s sense of adequacy and self-worth (self-affirmation). Insofar as fundamental assumptions about the preferability of certain political ideologies are typically a defining characteristic of a person’s self-identity, any threat to the socio-economic system that is associated with that political identity (such as the climate crisis demanding large scale social and economic transformations) motivates a defensive belief in alternative narratives offered by conspiracy theories, comparable to an immunity response. Moreover, to the extent that one’s sense of self-worth is based on the affiliation with a social group, one’s opinion tends to be influenced by the norms and standards of this group. This way political identities and/or group identities can serve as powerful subconscious motivational drivers for conspiratorial thinking, including climate science skepticism.

Conspiracy theories as substitutes for religious faith

In a study titled “Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of Mass Opinion” Eric Oliver and Thomas Wood found that conspiracy theories were significantly more likely to be supported by a) people with a preference for magical thinking (a tendency to believe in the existence of unseen intentional forces behind significant events), as well as by b) people who are attracted to Manichean narratives (an interpretation of the course of the world as a constant battle between good and evil forces). It is notable that these rather simplistic worldview assumptions seem to offer a fertile ground for religious beliefs and conspiracy theories alike. Indeed, it appears that more often than not conspiracy theories are filling a postmodern mythological void in the human psyche that has been left by the retreat of traditional religions and the scientific disenchantment of the world. Conspiracy theories fulfill similar functions as myths, cults or religions by:

providing a sense of purpose and control within a cruel and chaotic universe,
building community among like-minded believers who identify themselves as part of an oppressed, enlightened minority,
making sense through simple explanations for the existence of human suffering.

In contrast to a cult or religion, conspiratorial thinking neither requires a formal membership nor is it subject to a leader’s authority. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the belief in a conspiracy theory might be at least partially protected by the freedom of religion, besides the protection granted by the freedom of speech. On the other hand, it is obvious that any constitutional protection meets its limitations whenever the expression of one’s faith begins to negatively impact other people. Clearly, conspiracy theories that directly or indirectly dehumanize, disparage or hurt other human beings, or result in a gross neglect of existential risks to current or future generations, cannot reasonably enjoy the full protection of either religion or speech.

Conspiracy theories as a socio-cultural response to economic globalization and postmodernism

A cursory analysis of socio-cultural developments during the second half of the 20th century indicates an increasing level of public awareness about confirmed cases of corporate propaganda (e.g. downplaying the risks of tobacco consumption or the catastrophic long-term risks of burning fossil fuels) as well as government propaganda (e.g. legitimizing secret/unjustified military interventions, systematic invasions of privacy and civil rights, and economic deregulation at the expense of the public). With support from fake (or ideologically biased) experts under the disguise of scientific credibility, numerous disinformation campaigns were initiated by a growing PR industry and delivered by increasingly privatized, advertising revenue-dependent news media outlets. After the end of the cold war, a neoliberal narrative of human progress driven by globalization, market liberalization and privatization became dominant in the public sphere, while growing parts of the population, for whom the promise of improved living conditions didn’t perceptively materialize, felt increasingly misrepresented and left behind. As economic inequality generally continued to rise, many developed economies saw a shrinking and struggling middle class experience a traumatizing loss of confidence and control. The eventual journalistic exposure of corporate and governmental attempts at manufacturing consent through mainstream media created a substantial level of distrust among an increasingly frustrated, disillusioned and cynical part of the population. Around the same period, as Lee McIntyre points out, were human flaws in the practical execution of the scientific enterprise exposed by postmodern critiques of modern rationality, further increasing distrust in an opaque and fragmented scientific discipline. But instead of a careful reassessment of the epistemic risks and opportunities within the domains of policy making, journalism and science, a common response has been a negation of their epistemic potential in its entirety. For substantial parts of the population, the practice of “critical thinking” became synonymous with generally distrusting any information provided by mainstream media channels, while putting an irrationally high level of trust into ideologically aligned alternative newsmedia. The emergence of algorithm-based personalized misinformation campaigns via social media (fittingly coined “computational propaganda” by Rene DiResta) further amplified and redirected a smoldering collective anger towards scapegoats with supposedly evil intentions, such as the “deep state” or a “global elite”, while promoting the rise of radical nationalism that continues to characterize the early 21st century.