How to tell the difference between a conspiracy theory and a theory about a conspiracy

4 min readNov 29, 2020

Photo by The New York Public Library on Unsplash

Part 1/5: The problem with conspiracy theories

It’s not easy to think for oneself properly

The Enlightenment movement is known for its motto “sapere aude” — a Latin proverb which can be translated as “dare to know”, or, as Immanuel Kant put it in his famous 1784 essay “Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” as “have the audacity to think for yourself”. Today, it seems that there is no shortage of people who are following this motto rather faithfully, although the original spirit of the Enlightenment itself (which eventually paved the way for universal human rights, freedom of research etc) seems to have gone lost over time. Unfortunately, in the current era of “post-truth politics” and “hypernormalisation”, all this self-declared independent thinking has been unable to prevent an increasing influence of counterfactual, hyperbolic and distorted truth-claims on political decision making processes, which are eroding the foundation of modern (post-democractic) liberal societies. In this context, conspiracy theories provide the appearance of legitimacy by weaving together pieces of misinformation and information into a (mostly) logically coherent narrative. Even the supporters of the most outlandish conspiracy theories claim to “critically” think for themselves. But the example of the “flat earth society”, which includes well educated and intelligent human beings, who — based on their own research and empirical validation efforts with today’s technological means — are coming to the firm conclusion that the earth must be flat and that the general population has been misinformed, or “disinformed” (i.e. deliberately misinformed), clearly shows that thinking for oneself properly is much easier said than done. In fact, it is a huge intellectual challenge independent of a person’s level of intelligence and education.

Conspiracy theories can have consequences

While the flat earthers’ belief in a flat earth can likely be ignored as an odd manifestation of postmodern irrationality, the stakes are dramatically higher with regard to the climate crisis. Contrary to a constantly accumulating body of empirical evidence and increasingly alarming warning signals, many climate science skeptics remain convinced that a nefarious leftist elite, with support from a dishonest and self-serving scientific community, is fabricating a climate crisis as a means to assert a socialist reform agenda. Owing to this conspiracy theory, climate science publications and public accounts are not being trusted, and initiatives to reduce the annual volume of greenhouse gas emissions are believed to be unnecessarily risking jobs, liberties and economic growth. Based on various fallacies and techniques of science denial, urgently needed climate policies and decarbonisation efforts are being blocked, delayed and trivialized. Recently, more subtle discursive strategies to delay climate action have emerged. In conclusion, the conspiratorial thinking that is enabling and supporting climate science skepticism has become a key contributing factor to the shortcoming of climate action that is threatening the continuation of human civilization in the 21st century. It is therefore imperative for the climate movement to understand how conspiratorial thinking works, and what can be done in order to limit its pandemic contagion, while at the same time continuing to push for radical and bold climate action as much as possible.

The standard of evidence for a conspiracy theory should be similar to that of a criminal prosecution or an investigative report

Taken literally, the term “conspiracy theory” refers to a theory about a group of human agents who are secretly collaborating towards an outcome that is adverse to the interest of the general public. However, in everyday language, the term “conspiracy theory” tends to be used in a derogatory sense, referring to a particularly “weak” theory, which is unlikely to be valid. This is not to say that conspiracies are by default delusional — secret alliances among parties with shared interests are to be expected and well-known to exist, e.g. in the context of organized crime, illegal business conduct or underground movements aiming at changing ( or maintaining) political power structures. But while we should be careful not to dismiss conspiracy theories too easily, it would be careless as well to take them at face value without a level of intellectual rigor that is proportionate to the gravity of the claims and allegations being made. Extraordinary claims require extraordinarily strong evidence. Indeed, it is arguable that the standard of evidence for conspiracy theories should be similar to that of a criminal prosecution or an investigative report. If we were to assume the role of an impartial judge or of an independent newspaper editor (with a professional reputation and potential libel lawsuits to lose), our requirement on the strength of the evidence base supporting a conspiracy theory would be rather high. We would consider it a terrible mistake if egregious yet false allegations were made on the grounds of sloppy research, corrupt intelligence, misinterpreted sources, or speculative claims. It is therefore up to the conspiracy theorist to present sufficiently strong and compelling evidence “beyond a reasonable doubt”. Until this burden of proof is met, the presumption of innocence applies. Even a — generally understandable — frustration with the social reality of a (more or less) dysfunctional judicial system or a (more or less) ideologically biased news media industry doesn’t legitimize a lowering of this standard — on the contrary, it makes it even more important to uphold it.