How to tell the difference between a conspiracy theory and a theory about a conspiracy

7 min readDec 1, 2020

Part 4/5: The worldview and the epistemology behind conspiratorial thinking

Taken together, the psychological mechanisms and the socio-cultural developments since WW2 have reinforced and promoted rather simplistic, distrustful worldviews as well as non-rational and nihilistic epistemologies within different parts of the population across as well as outside the political spectrum. Therefore, two questions can help us distinguish a conspiracy theory from a theory about a conspiracy:

1) what kind of worldview is behind a given theory?

2) what kind of epistemology is behind a given theory?

The different worldviews behind conspiracy theories and theories about conspiracies

A person’s worldview represents an axiomatic theory about the nature of the physical and social world, a basic belief system of mutually supporting fundamental assumptions about time and causality, human nature and morality, the roles and functions of social systems etc. This worldview also serves as the metaphysical foundation for a person’s reasoning and self-identity. It is formed through early life experiences and usually solidifies as the person continues to age. Core worldview assumptions tend to serve as important pillars for one’s self-identity and are therefore more “crystalline”, whereas peripheral non-identity-related worldview assumptions tend to be more “malleable”. Taking a closer look at conspiratorial thinking, one can recognize a pattern: conspiracy theories tend to be based on rather simplistic and distrustful worldviews that are based on the assumption of an ordered, easily explainable black-and-white world, which leaves little room for co-incidences, nuances or ambivalence, and emphasizes intentional human agency as a root cause of evil and human suffering. The social domains of media, science and government are distrusted in their entirety as potential sources of truth and considered either malevolent or corrupted. In contrast, the worldview behind a theory about a conspiracy tends to be more complex and differentiated. It is generally open to the chaotic possibility of co-incidents, and the simultaneous possibility of human suffering being caused by human ignorance, greed and stupidity, as well as by the (often unintentional) consequences of social structures and systems driving human behavior. While flaws within the practices of science, journalism and government are acknowledged, their potential for truthful information and sensible behavior is recognized as well. Archetypical beliefs of a simplistic, distrustful worldview on the one hand and a more complex, differentiated worldview on the other are shown in the table below. This is not to say that every conspiracy theorist necessarily needs to have simplistic and distrustful worldviews. However, it seems that elements of such a worldview tend to increase the likelihood of conspiracy theories being supported.

The epistemology behind a theory about a conspiracy

A person’s epistemology represents an axiomatic theory about the metaphysical nature of truth, and the means, possibilities and limitations of recognizing it. Theories about a conspiracy are based on a “rational/scientific” epistemology which makes a distinction between different types of truth-claims (factual, rational/scientific, and subjective) and aspires to rely as much as possible on ‘facts” and well-established “rational/scientific findings”, while minimizing its reliance on subjective beliefs and personal opinions. The following descriptions of those different types of truths are own re-interpretations based on Hannah Ahrendt’s essay “Truth and Politics”:

Factual truths (“Tatsachenwahrheiten”) are based on empirical data which directly refers to an objective reality (e.g. historical accounts, observations, measurements, descriptions). The coherence of factual truth-claims with that objective reality depends on the quality and integrity of the respective data points which can potentially be subject to manipulation or error. To increase the level of confidence, the integrity, accuracy and comprehensiveness of data needs to be audited.
Rational/scientific truths (“Vernunftwahrheiten”) refer to well established scientific, mathematical and/or philosophical premises, including logically coherent interpretations of facts and data points and premises about causality and relationships. Rational/scientific findings are intersubjective and preliminary in nature, as their validity is constantly subject to potential falsification and critique by other rational agents. Strong theories correspond with well-established rational/scientific truth-claims.
Subjective truths (“Meinungen”) refer to statements about personal values, moral judgements, political preferences, worldview assumptions, religious faith and unconscious speculation, for example. Subjective truth-claims are subjective because their validity is dependent on one’s own self-confirmation, based on the strength of one’s feelings and intuitions about them. From a subjective viewpoint, high levels of confidence can be justified with regard to the authenticity of political opinions, religious beliefs and personal feelings, for example. However, the epistemic justifiability of a high level of confidence in a theory about our physical or social reality ultimately depends on its objective strength. Therefore, a person’s faith in a weak theory can be interpreted as a subjective truth, until a strengthening evidence base gradually transforms this private belief into an intersubjective, rational/scientific truth.

The epistemology behind conspiracy theories

The epistemology associated with conspiratorial thinking tends to be either non-rational or nihilistic (anti-rational). A non-rational epistemology reduces the criteria by which to determine the strength of a theory to intuitive plausibility (commonly referred to as “common sense”). The intuitive plausibility of a theory is determined by its alignment with a given worldview. For a non-rational epistemic agent, whatever “feels” like the truth, is mistaken for the truth. If a theory intuitively “makes sense”, it is deemed to have merit. The criteria for the validity of subjective truth-claims (plausibility, authenticity, trustworthiness, etc.) have effectively become the criteria for the validity of any kind of truth-claim. A nihilistic epistemology, in contrast, categorically denies the relevance of an objective reality and reduces a truth-claim’s validity to its utility for the epistemic agent. Truth is whatever serves the nihilist’s interests. A typical example for epistemic nihilism can be found in the quote “I only trust the statistics that I have doctored myself”, which has been falsely attributed to Winston Churchill. Both non-rational and nihilistic epistemologies have in common that facts, rationality and science are reduced to a means to an end — a persuasive instrument that is useful for as long as it supports one’s own beliefs. Truth is understood as something that can be privately and individually owned. A possible explanation for the rise of nihilistic and non-rational epistemologies has been provided by Hanna Arendt in 1963, who sharply observed that people who were subjected to brainwashing attempts tend to respond with a refutation of the concept of truth in general: When the presentation of facts is constantly at risk of being fabricated, the human sense for reality, which cannot function without the distinction between truth and falsehood, is annihilated. In the end, both non-rational as well as nihilistic epistemologies have effectively lost the ability to differentiate between facts and rational/scientific findings on the one hand and subjective truth-claims on the other. When this distinction is getting lost, two things tend to happen:

Factual and rational/scientific truths are confused with subjective truths, leading to an underappreciation of their explanatory value. By reducing facts and findings to mere opinions, it appears as if the propagation of factual/rational/scientific falsehoods would be a completely private matter, falling under the protection of free speech regardless of any negative consequences.
Opinions and speculation are confused with factual/rational/scientific truths, which overappretiates their empirical validity. It is typical that correlation is confused with causation, for example. Even the most absurd conjectures are possibly taken as granted, regardless of the actual strength of their evidence base. Some conspiracy theorists, as Stephan Lewandowsky points out, even go as far as to declare the absence of evidence as evidence in itself in order to support their allegations.
A comparison between non-rational and nihilistic epistemologies underlying conspiracy theories as opposed to the rational (scientific) epistemology underlying a theory about a conspiracy is provided below.

It’s an epistemic trap!

The combination of a simplistic, distrustful worldview and a non-rational/nihilistic epistemology represents a fatal epistemic trap — it not only facilitates the acceptance and proliferation of weak theories as strong ones and vice versa, but also hinders an evolution towards a more complex, differentiated worldview. The non-rational/nihilistic epistemology ensures that the conspiracy theorist’s worldview cannot evolve into a more complex, differentiated version of itself through factual or rational/scientific arguments. The simplistic, distrustful worldview, in turn, ensures that a non-rational/nihilistic epistemology cannot evolve into a more rational/scientific version of itself. Once science, public accounts and mainstream media are per se no longer considered trustworthy sources of potential truth or evidence, the only sources remaining to assess the validity of truth-claims are one’s own intuition as well as the intuitions and opinions of those who are considered to be part of a trusted (i.e. like-minded) community. Conspiracy theorists become trapped within their own subjective reality bubbles (like the “populist bubble”, for example), unable to escape by themselves. Within that bubble, the possibility for real learning and advancement of knowledge is firmly constrained: no longer can new and surprising facts and findings fundamentally challenge and improve an existing worldview. It should be obvious that as an advanced civilization we cannot reasonably wish for non-rational/nihilistic epistemologies to ever become socially dominant theories of truth. If this were to happen, humanity would be thrown back into pre-modern times intellectually, making hundreds of years of cultural, scientific and epistemic progress obsolete. Since the late 20th century post-cold war democratic societies have already become increasingly polarized: the collective subjective realities constructed by different sub-populations — in particular between those which have fallen into the epistemic trap and those which haven’t — have drifted so far apart that there is little common ground left.